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Introduction 
Amid recurrent media depictions of ‘sinking islands’ and scenarios of mass relocation of 
island communities from low-lying atolls, three consistent messages from Pacific peoples 
can be heard. The first is that for most, their wish and intention is to continue to live in 
their home countries despite the mounting effects of climate change with dignity, in 
safety and prosperity.1 Secondly, Pacific communities have no wish to relieve the 
international community of its obligations and commitments to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by offering large-scale migration from low-lying islands as ‘the’ solution to 
climate change within the region. Thirdly, migration should, if it is ultimately necessary, 
be undertaken in a planned, coordinated way, respecting and reflecting the resilience of 
people who are no strangers to re-establishing themselves in new environments in 
response to changing environmental conditions. This is what they have done for 
centuries.  
 
For over 150 years, New Zealand has played a significant role in the South Pacific. 
Vibrant cultural, political, economic, and sporting interchanges reflect recognition 
amongst a broad cross-section of New Zealand society that its spiritual as well as 
geographic home is within the southern waters of the Pacific, rather than cities or fields 
of Europe. New Zealand hosts significant expatriate populations of Samoan, Tongan, 
Tuvaluan and others of Pacific origin. The ancestors of its indigenous Maori population 
traversed the Pacific Ocean to establish their home there.  
 
Given its strong ties with other South Pacific nations, it would be natural to expect New 
Zealand’s support role to flow into proactive planning, and legal and policy provision for 
responding to the effects of climate change in the Pacific. To an extent, it has. New 
Zealand is a significant donor to many Pacific countries. It has committed to on-going 
financial and technical support on climate change adaptation projects in a number of 
low-lying island states, including a recently announced five-year partnership to improve 
water security in Tuvalu, Tokelau, Kiribati, the Cook Islands and the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands.2  
                                                        
1 For a recent discussion of the tension between the desire of residents of low-lying Pacific islands to remain 
in their home locations and the potential for migration see, for example Smith, R & McNamara, K, 
‘Government discourses of climate change migration in Tuvalu and Kiribati’, 8 July 2013, editorial on the 
website of the Asia-Pacific Migration and Environment Network 
http://apmen.iom.int/en/m/editorials/item/141-government-discourses-of-climate-change-migration-in-
tuvalu-and-kiribati   
2 New Zealand Prime Minister John Key news release 4 September 2013 ‘Clean water initiative for low-
lying Pacific islands’ http://www.johnkey.co.nz/archives/1715-Clean-water-initiative-for-low-lying-Pacific-
islands.html 
 
New Zealand’s support for in situ adaptation measures amongst its Pacific neighbours is 
not in real doubt. Its position on the more contentious aspect of climate change 
adaptation within the Pacific: whether, and to what extent, New Zealand would be 
willing to open its borders to climate change-displaced persons in the region less clear.3 
This paper examines legal and policy issues arising out of the latter issue. 
 
Scale and pattern of climate change migration in the South Pacific 
An informed assessment of legal and policy issues associated with climate displacement in 
the South Pacific would logically build upon robust assessments of the scale and pattern 
of existing and predicted future climate-influenced migration and displacement in the 
region. However, despite sustained interest in this area by academics, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and regional inter-governmental organizations for over ten years, 
there remains a dearth of information on, and considerable debate over, likely future 
migration and displacement flows which can be directly or indirectly attributed to the 
effects of climate change.4 
 
In 2009, Waikato University geographer John Campbell estimated that there would be 
between 665,000 and 1.7M climate-displaced people in the Pacific by 2050.5 A major 
2012 study on existing and predicted future population movement in the Pacific 
commissioned by New Zealand’s Department of Labour reached the conclusion that 
climate change represented a “threat to the livelihoods, security and well-being of Pacific 
people…which may force mass migrations”, however did not include any quantification 
of the potential numbers involved.6  
 
                                                        
3 It is noted at the outset that migration to ‘developed’ South Pacific countries such as New Zealand or 
Australia is by no means the only, or likely even to be the preferred option, in the event that citizens of 
low-lying Pacific countries are not able to remain in their home nations as a result of climate change 
impacts. As noted by Elliott & Fagan, ‘Some people have raised the possibility of expanded systems of 
migration to Australia and New Zealand, but Pacific leaders have suggested it might be more appropriate 
to call for support from Australia and New Zealand to help people resettle to other Pacific Islands. These 
islands may provide a more suitable cultural context for displaced rural communities.’ M Elliot and D 
Fagan. "From Community to Copenhagen: Civil Society Action on Climate Change in the Pacific" in 
Bruce Burson (ed),Climate Change and Migration: South Pacific Perspectives (Wellington, IPS, 2009) at 
75 
4	  A leading New Zealand commentator on climate change related displacement and migration, Bruce 
Burson, recently observed, “The lack of acurate information on the possibel migratory consequnces of 
climate change impedes our ability to adequately prepare for and comprehensively respond to the 
humanitarian and protection needs of environmental migrants. Understanding more clearly the potential 
scale and patterns of climate change related migration is therefore the most pressing issue.” Burson, B, 
‘Securing Meaningful International Agreement on Climate Change Related Displacement and Migration: 
The Refugee Convention as a Window on International Burden (Responsibility) – Sharing in an 
Involuntary Movement Context’ in Climate Change and Displacement Reader (Scott Leckie, Ezekiel 
Simperingham and Jordan Bakker, eds., Taylor & Francis, Routledge/Earthscan, 2012, at 159.   
5 Campbell, J,  ‘Pacific Island Populations 2009’, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Noumea, cited in 
Campbell, J ‘Climate Change and Population Movement in Pacific Island Countries’ in ‘Climate Change 
and Migration: South Pacific Perspectives’, Burson, B (ed), 2010, Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington at 
12 at 38.  
6 Bedford R and Hugo GJ (2012) Population Movement in the Pacific: A Perspective on Future Prospects. 
Department of Labour, New Zealand, at vi. 
In May 2013, conveners of the Nansen Initiative published a background report in 
preparation for consultative meetings involving representatives of Pacific nations and 
other stakeholders with an interest in displacement and migration implications of climate 
change in the region. In a similar vein to the 2012 New Zealand Department of Labour 
report, the authors of the Nansen background report noted that (for a range of reasons, 
including demographic, population, economic and environmental) “human mobility in 
the Pacific region is expected to significantly increase in the coming decades and 
beyond”.7 No attempt was made however to arrive at quantitative estimates of numbers. 
 
For the purpose of this paper, a related (and obvious) question is: what proportion of the 
number of climate-displaced persons within the South Pacific region may seek to be 
resettled within New Zealand? Attempted answers to that question are, at this stage, 
likely to be speculative. As far as the author is aware, no specific empirical investigations 
have taken place. What is known however, is that: New Zealand has significant expatriate 
communities of people of South Pacific origin whose members retain ongoing and strong 
links with relatives in their countries of historic origin;8 empirical studies within South 
Pacific countries and in New Zealand indicate that New Zealand is seen as a natural and 
desirable destination for migration by some;9 and a number of leaders of Pacific countries 
have identified New Zealand as a country whose assistance is sought to facilitate planned 
migration as one of a number of adaptive responses to the effects of climate change.10 
  
Protection deficit in international law 
 
International conventions and documents 
There are a number of conventions and documents with potential relevance to the legal 
status and protection of persons displaced as a result of climate change, analysed 
extensively in the academic and NGO literature. They include: the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees; 11 the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
                                                        
7 Background Paper: ‘Human Mobility, Natural Disasters and Climate Change in the Pacific’, May 2013, 
Nansen Initiative Secretariat, Geneva at 2. 
8 See: Shen, S, Gemenne, F “Contrasted Views on Environmental Change and Migration: the Case of 
Tuvaluan Migration to New Zealand,” International Migration, Volume 49, Issue Supplement s1, 19 May 
2011 (3000 Tuvaluan’s estimated to reside in New Zealand). In January 2013, New Zealand’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade recorded on its website ‘There is a vibrant I-Kiribati community of over 2,000 
people in New Zealand’ http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Pacific/Kiribati.php. 2006 census statistics for 
other Pacific populations in New Zealand include: Samoan (131,103); Cook Islands Maori (58,008); 
Tongan (50, 481); Niuean (22,476), Fijian (9,864); Tokelauan (6,819).  
9 See, for example, Fedor, I. (2012). ‘Cultural and National Identity in the Face of Climate Change: A 
Case Study of I-Kiribati Migrants in New Zealand’ (Thesis, Master of Arts). University of Otago, at I; 
Shen, S, Gemenne, F, “Contrasted Views on Environmental Change and Migration: the Case of Tuvaluan 
Migration to New Zealand,” International Migration , Volume 49, Issue Supplement s1, 19 May 2011, at 
1. 
10 President Anote Tong of Kiribati has, to date, been the most vocal of Pacific leaders in this regard. For a 
statement of his office’s position on relocation as one of a number of responses to the effects of climate 
change in Kiribati see http://www.climate.gov.ki/category/action/relocation/. For a useful recent analysis of 
contrasting views, see Smith, R, ‘Should they stay or should they go? A discourse analysis of factors 
influencing relocation decisions among the outer islands of Tuvalu and Kiribati’ Journal of New Zealand 
& Pacific Studies, Volume 1, Number 1, 1 April 2013, pp. 23-39(17). 
11 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (189 UNTS 137), in conjunction with 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 606 UNTS 267. New Zealand acceded to the 1951 Convention 
on 30 June 1960 and to the 1967 Protocol on 6 August 1973. 
Political Rights;12 the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights;13 the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (not yet ratified 
by New Zealand); the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (ratified by 
New Zealand in 2006); the 1998 United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement; the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and subsidiary instruments.   
 
A detailed account of the arguments for and against the relevance and application of 
these instruments or documents to climate-displaced persons is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  In summary however, none provide unequivocal binding direction on countries 
such as New Zealand concerning domestic obligations to assist the citizens of other states 
displaced as a result of climate change.14   
 
Regional instruments 
There are no existing legally binding regional conventions or treaties which address 
obligations of developed countries with the South Pacific region such as New Zealand 
towards their Pacific counterparts in the climate change context. 
 
In 2008, members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) signed what is known as the ‘Niue 
Declaration’, described at the time as ‘the first ever climate change declaration for the 
region.’15 The document records (non-binding) commitments of signatories to ongoing 
advocacy and support on regional and international climate change mitigation measures.   
 
Notably (for the issues discussed in this paper), under the Niue Declaration, leaders of 
the PIF undertook to: 
 
ENCOURAGE the Pacific’s Development Partners to increase their technical 
and financial support for climate change action on adaptation, mitigation and, 
if necessary, relocation, while welcoming the pledged increases in resources 
to address the climate change challenge… 
 
(emphasis added)  
 
                                                        
12 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 171. 
13 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
14 In Cancun in 2010, parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change agreed to 
take 'measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate-change 
induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and 
international levels'. Notably, this has explicitly brought the issue of climate migration onto the UNFCCC 
agenda. However the agreement imposes no binding obligations on nations. It can be regarded as no more 
than a start to what may be a long process of negotiation within that forum. Conference of the Parties to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties at its Sixteenth Session, (Addendum Pt 2 to the Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010) FCCC/CP/2010/7/ Add.1, 
(15 March 2011) 5 ('COP16').  
15 Niue Declaration on Climate Change, 39th Pacific Islands Forum, Forum Communiqué Annex B (19-20 
August 2008). 
Responding to threats from climate change on Pacific states was a central topic for 
discussion at the September 2013 meeting of the PIF in the Marshall Islands capital 
Majuro in September 2013.  The widely publicised ‘Majuro Declaration’ was a key 
output of that meeting – a document which develops, with greater urgency, themes 
addressed five years earlier in Niue.16  Unsurprisingly, provisions of the Majuro 
Declaration highlight the need for, and commitment to, measures to ‘urgently reduce 
and phase down greenhouse gas pollution in order to avert a climate crisis for present and 
future generations.’  The need for support for adaptive measures is addressed, but the 
document omits the reference to ‘relocation’ made in the Niue Declaration: 
 
In addition, we commit to accelerate and intensify our efforts to prepare for and 
adapt to the intensifying impacts of climate change, and to further develop and 
implement policies, strategies and legislative frameworks, with support where 
necessary, to climate-proof our essential physical infrastructure, adapt our key 
economic sectors and ensure climate-resilient sustainable development for present and 
future generations. 
 
New Zealand legal and policy framework 
Contrary to the (mis)understandings of an intriguing number of international 
commentators,17 New Zealand has no specific immigration policies which, explicitly at 
least, are intended to address hardship and deprivation experienced in South Pacific 
nations as a result of climate change. 
 
New Zealand does have a number of targeted immigration schemes which include 
capped quotas allowing defined groups from defined Pacific nations to participate in an 
annual ballot, and if successful, have the opportunity to then be considered against a 
number of other criteria (including language, income and work offer requirements). 
Most notably, they include the Pacific Access Category (PAC), the Samoan Quota and 
the Recognised Seasonal Employment (RSE) Scheme.   Each of these schemes is well 
known by citizens of most Pacific nations, and the policies appear to be regarded as 
important practical and symbolic reflections of ties between New Zealand and Pacific 
nations.   It is understood that all of the targeted schemes are fully subscribed. There are 
no indications however that the government is planning to increase target/quota 
numbers, whether in response to increased demand by an ever-growing South Pacific 
population, or in light of existing and predicted future drivers for migration and 
displacement associated with deteriorating environmental conditions because of climate 
change. 
 
Refugee status in New Zealand for climate displaced persons 
A number of cases have come before the New Zealand Immigration and Protection 
Tribunal (formerly, the Refugee Appeals Authority) involving applicants seeking refugee 
                                                        
16 Majuro Declaration for Climate Leadership, 44th Pacific Islands Forum, Majuro, Marshall Islands (5 
September 2013). 
17 Jane McAdam lists a number of academic publications which perpetuate the error, noting that it appears 
that the misunderstanding was perpetuated by Al Gore’s film, An Inconvenient Truth, in McAdam, J, 2011, 
'Refusing 'Refuge' in the Pacific: (De)Constructing Climate-Induced Displacement in International Law', 
in Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pecoud & Paul de Guchtenieree (ed.), Migration and Climate Change, 
Cambridge University Press/ UNESCO, Cambridge, footnote 86, at 18. 
status relying at least in part on hardship and deprivation in their home countries caused 
or contributed to by climate change. Consistent on this point with similar cases in 
Australia18, the appeals have, without exception been unsuccessful. 
 
In 2000, a group of appeals was heard by the New Zealand Refugee Appeals Authority 
(as it was then named) involving applications for refugee status from related appellants 
from Tuvalu.19 In similar terms, the Tuvaluan family members advanced grounds for 
refugee status in New Zealand, citing concern at rising sea levels which would exacerbate 
existing issues of inundation of the family home, together with poor medical facilities  
and the scarcity of employment opportunities within their home country. It was also 
submitted that ‘the Tuvalu government failed in its duty of protecting the civil political, 
social, cultural and economic rights of the appellant for reasons of race (Tuvaluan), as 
nationals of Tuvalu (citizens) and as a member of a particular social group (defined as 
having no means to sustain themselves and survive).’ 
 
The RAA dismissed the appeals, holding:20 
 
Clearly, none of the fears articulated by the appellant vis-à-vis his return to 
Tuvalu, can be said to be for reason of any one of the five Convention grounds in 
terms of the Refugee Convention, namely race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular group and political opinion. This is not a case where the appellant 
can be said to be differentially at risk of harm amounting to persecution due to any one 
of these five grounds. All Tuvalu citizens face the same environmental 
problems and economic difficulties living in Tuvalu.  
 
In 2013, an appeal was brought to the successor of the RAA, the New Zealand 
Immigration and Protection Tribunal by a resident of Kiribati, also seeking asylum in 
New Zealand in large part due to deprivation resulting from adverse environmental 
conditions caused by climate change in his home country.  
 
The decision of BL Burson, Member of the IPT, in the 2013 AF (Kiribati)21 case may 
well represent the most detailed legal analysis of an application for asylum on behalf of a 
climate-displaced person anywhere in the international refugee jurisprudence to date.  
 
On behalf of the IPT, Burson accepted in its entirety, the evidence adduced on behalf of 
the i-Kiribati appellant relating to the physical and geographical vulnerability of Kiribati 
to existing and future effects of climate change, including rising sea levels, “risks to the 
land resource based livelihood of the people are from droughts, inundation of land from 
storm surges, salt water intrusion to water lenses, and excessive rainfall creating runoff 
into drinking groundwater wells”, coastal erosion, deterioration of marine resources 
including coral reefs and fish stocks.22 In combination with growing population, general 
                                                        
18 See footnote 21. 
19 Refugee Appeal No 72185 (10 August 2000); Refugee Appeal No 72186 (10 August 2000); Refugee Appeal 
Nos 72189-72195 (17 August 2000); Refugee Appeal Nos 72179-72181 (31 August 2000); Refugee Appeal 
No 72313 (19 October 2000); Refugee Appeal No 72314 (19 October 2000); Refugee Appeal No 72315 (19 
October 2000); Refugee Appeal No 72316 (19 October 2000). 
20 Refugee Appeal No 72185 (10 August 2000) at para [16]. 
21 AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413. 
22  At para [38], it is recorded ‘The Tribunal finds the appellant to be credible. His account was told 
economic conditions, the IPT accepted without demur the significant hardships already 
being experienced by residents of the low-lying atolls, as well as predicted future 
difficulties that will arise as the range of effects of climate change make themselves known 
with increasing intensity in Kiribati. 
 
Consistent with previous New Zealand23 and Australian decisions,24 the IPT dismissed 
the appeal. On the central claim for refugee status under the 1951 Convention, the IPT 
held:25 
..the appellant’s claim under the Refugee Convention must necessarily fail because the 
effects of environmental degradation on his standard of living were, by his own 
admission, faced by the population generally. The sad reality is that the environmental 
degradation caused by both slow and sudden onset natural disasters is one which is faced 
by the Kiribati population generally. 
 
A parallel submission that denying the appellant’s asylum in New Zealand (thus 
requiring him to return to Kiribati) would contravene Article 6 of the ICCPR (the ‘right 
to life’) was also rejected:26 
 
… the risk to the appellant and his family still falls well short of the threshold required to 
establish substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of arbitrary 
deprivation of life within the scope of Article 6. It remains firmly in the realm of 
conjecture or surmise. 
 
In dismissing the appeal, the IPT took care to make it clear that the decision should not 
be regarded as definitively rejecting the potential for refugee or protection status under 
New Zealand or international law in all instances where displacement has or will occur in 
circumstances involving the effect of climate change. The decision contains an impressive 
analysis of climate change-influenced displacement under international refugee and 
human rights law, and careful qualification of its findings.27  
 
Nevertheless the decision confirms the position already taken in previous New Zealand 
refugee appeals, international case law and academic commentary, namely that under 
New Zealand’s existing legal regime for refugees and immigrants (itself built upon the 
existing international law in this area), only in the most exceptional circumstances will 
persons displaced as a result of climate change be entitled to legal recognition as refugees 
or protected persons. 
 
New Zealand government policy development 
In summary, under the existing international and domestic legal and policy framework, 
persons seeking refuge in New Zealand from the worst impacts of climate change in the 
                                                                                                                                                               
candidly and openly. It is accepted in its entirety.’ 
23 Refugee Appeal No 72185 (10 August 2000); Refugee Appeal No 72186 (10 August 2000); Refugee Appeal 
Nos 72189-72195 (17 August 2000); Refugee Appeal Nos 72179-72181 (31 August 2000); Refugee Appeal 
No 72313 (19 October 2000); Refugee Appeal No 72314 (19 October 2000); Refugee Appeal No 72315 (19 
October 2000); Refugee Appeal No 72316 (19 October 2000); BG (Fiji) [2012] NZIPT 800091.  
24 For example, 0907346 [2009] RRTA 1168 (10 December 2009).  
25 AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, at [75]. 
26 AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, at [91]. 
27 See, in particular, paras [56] – [65]. 
South Pacific have no clear legal avenues available to them.  Existing immigration 
schemes such as the PAC, Samoan Quota and RSE may provide opportunities for some 
seeking temporary or permanent residence in New Zealand. However, those schemes 
require pre-arranged employment with minimum obligations for financial support.  They 
are also tightly controlled in terms of annual quotas. 
 
There is no obvious sign of any existing or imminent ‘wave’ of would-be migrants to 
New Zealand from the South Pacific. However despite the lack of empirical analysis on 
the likely future migration flows within the South Pacific as a result of climate change-
related effects, it is not especially controversial that by 2050, large numbers of South 
Pacific residents will have been displaced as a result of a combination of population and 
environmental factors. It would be naïve, given New Zealand’s existing strong ties with 
its South Pacific neighbours, to expect anything other than a significant increase in the 
numbers of Pacific residents seeking refuge in the relatively climate-change buffered 
environment of New Zealand.28   
 
One might expect that the New Zealand government would be actively considering the 
implications from a legal, policy and practical perspective of future migration and 
displacement scenarios within the region.29 Is it happening? 
 
In a 2011 article, Australian academic Jane McAdam cited a 2008 New Zealand Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) document as evidence of a ‘revised’ approach 
towards the issue of ‘environmental migrants’ in the South Pacific.30 According to the 
MFAT document, New Zealand’s new focus would be to: 
 
a) acknowledge the concerns of Pacific Island countries in relation to this issue; 
b) stress that current climate change efforts in the Pacific should continue to focus on 
adaptation, and should be underpinned by the desire of Pacific peoples to continue to 
live in their own countries; and  
c) reaffirm that New Zealand has a proven history of providing assistance where needed 
in the Pacific, and that our approach to environmentally displaced persons would be 
consistent with this. 
.. This includes a commitment to ‘respond to climatic disasters in the Pacific and 
manage changes as they arise.’ 
 
In March 2013, the author lodged a request under the Official Information Act 1982 
(OIA) seeking a formal response as to whether there had been any further consideration 
                                                        
28 For a summary of anticipated climate change impacts on New Zealand, see Rive, V & Weeks, T 
‘Adaptation to Climate Change in New Zealand’ in A Cameron (ed) ‘Climate Change Law and Policy in 
New Zealand’ (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2011) at ch 9, section 6.4. 
29  In 1990, the authors of a report representing the outcome of a six-month, prime ministerial-initiated 
study of New Zealand's relationship with Pacific nations noted "There is widespread concern in the region 
about the potentially profound effects of climate change, and especially a sea level rise would have on 
Pacific Island countries ...the region faces a major potential problem of environmental refugees." Amongst 
its recommendations were "That early consultations be held with the Governments of Kiribati and Tuvalu 
about the means by which their people might make up a greater proportion of Pacific Island immigrants.” 
South Pacific Policy Review Group (1990) ‘Towards a Pacific Island Community’ Wellington.  
30 McAdam, J, 2011, 'Refusing 'Refuge' in the Pacific: (De)Constructing Climate-Induced Displacement 
in International Law', in Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pecoud & Paul de Guchtenieree (ed.), Migration and 
Climate Change, Cambridge University Press / UNESCO, Cambridge. 
given to New Zealand’s legal and policy response to issues of climate-contributed 
displacement or migration within the South Pacific. Officials from MFAT and Ministry 
of Pacific Affairs were also interviewed. 
 
In response to the March 2013 OIA, a number of internal briefing and policy documents 
were provided. They confirm, in summary, that New Zealand’s domestic policy (and 
international positioning) on the issue of climate-displaced persons within the South 
Pacific has not advanced in any meaningful sense from the ‘revised approach’ adopted in 
2008, reported by McAdam. In a 2009 policy paper, MFAT and Department of Labour 
officials advised their Ministers:31 
 
“…New Zealand’s existing immigration policy settings are sufficiently flexible that they 
may be able to form one response to this issue, should it become a reality in future.  
Pacific migrants can currently enter New Zealand through general immigration policies, 
such as those for skilled migrants, temporary workers or family sponsorship.  There are 
also immigration policies specifically for Pacific countries, such as the Pacific Access 
Category (for migrants from Tuvalu, Kiribati and Tonga); the Samoan Quota and 
Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) Scheme.   
 
None of these policies were developed in response to climate change or climate induced 
migration although they could potentially be helpful in responding to it as part of a 
broader toolkit of policy options in which adaptation and mitigation options are given 
priority…” 
 
A January 2013 MFAT briefing paper to the Associate Climate Change Minister 
expanded on the theme:32 
 
“New Zealand’s policy on the issue of ‘environmental refugees’ remains under review.  
Such ‘refugees’ have no current status under international law…New Zealand has 
indicated that it will continue to respond to climatic disasters in the Pacific and manage 
changes as they arise… 
 
Media reporting that New Zealand has agreed to take ‘environmental refugees’ from 
Tuvalu…is incorrect.  There is no such policy.  However New Zealand will continue to 
monitor the situation and provide climate change assistance and disaster relief as it has 
always done.” 
 
Queried on the reference to New Zealand’s policy remaining ‘under review’, in a 
telephone interview on 28 May 2013, an MFAT official advised:33 
 
I think that in that context, I wouldn't want to imply that we have a grand process ... it's 
more like, we are keeping a watch on it… that if things change or we judge that we may 
                                                        
31 Joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Department of Labour submission to the Ministers of 
Foreign and Immigration 22 July 2009, released to the author under the Official Information Act 1982 in 
May 2013. 
32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade briefing to the Associate Minister of Climate Change, January 
2013 released to the author under the Official Information Act 1982 in May 2013. 
33 Telephone interview by the author of Mr Roger Dungan, Senior Policy Officer Climate Change 
Environment Division, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, 28 May 2013.  
 
need to refer to Ministers for more guidance, or whatever, then we will. To say it is 
"under review" doesn't mean that it is "under active review”. But it is not like the case is 
closed, and our policy is done and dusted. It is certainly a living thing, and we keep our 
eye on developments, that if something did come up that we needed to get some 
guidance or make recommendations to ministers on, then we would certainly do so. 
 
It is apparent that the government agency with responsibility for policy development on 
New Zealand’s response to climate-displacement in the South Pacific – MFAT – has not 
updated its policy since 2008, has no active working groups looking at the issue, and as 
recently as May 2013 has explicitly reconfirmed its position not to reassess its policy 
settings.34 This is despite: 
• An open call for New Zealand (as one of the ‘Pacific’s Development Partners’) to 
‘increase [its] technical and financial support for climate change action on adaptation, 
mitigation and, if necessary, relocation’ in the 2008 Niue Declaration;35 
• The issue of responses to climate displacement having been openly placed on the 
agenda for international consideration in a decision of the conference of parties to the 
UNFCCC in Cancun in 2010;36 
• Direct calls by Pacific leaders for engagement by New Zealand and Australia in 
consideration of a framework and process for planned migration-as-adaptation as part 
of a wider package of measures to address the impact of climate change on low-lying 
island states within the South Pacific.37 
 
Options and opportunities 
Over the past 10 years as issues of the potential magnitude and distribution of climate-
displaced people have begun to enter public consciousness through media reports and 
NGO awareness-raising, there has been an exponential growth in academic analysis and 
public policy consideration of various legal and policy responses to the issue.  
 
New or modified existing multi-lateral instruments? 
A range of possible solutions or responses to the ‘protection deficit’ at international law 
for climate-displaced persons has been developed and discussed in the literature, 
including: 
• Amending the 1951 Refugee Convention to specifically cover cross-border 
displacement as a result of environmental/climate change-caused degradation;  
                                                        
34 Compare the observations in Hausler, K & McCorquodale, R (2011): Climate change and its impact on 
security and survival, Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 37:4, 617-627; McAdam, J, 2011, 'Refusing 'Refuge' 
in the Pacific: (De)Constructing Climate-Induced Displacement in International Law', in Etienne Piguet, 
Antoine Pecoud & Paul de Guchtenieree (ed.), Migration and Climate Change, Cambridge University Press 
/ UNESCO, Cambridge, pp. 102 – 137 which indicate that the New Zealand government is in the process 
of developing a specific policy on Pacific climate migrants. It is not apparent to the author that this is the 
case. 
35 Niue Declaration on Climate Change, 39th Pacific Islands Forum, Forum Communiqué Annex B (19-20 
August 2008). 
36 See footnote 14. 
37 See, for example (in relation to Kiribati President Anote Tong), McAdam, J, 2011, 'Refusing 'Refuge' in 
the Pacific: (De)Constructing Climate-Induced Displacement in International Law', in Etienne Piguet, 
Antoine Pecoud & Paul de Guchtenieree (ed.), Migration and Climate Change, Cambridge University Press 
/ UNESCO, Cambridge at footnote 76. 
• Developing a new, stand-alone multilateral treaty or convention on climate 
change/environmental displacement;38 
• Developing a new protocol to the UNFCCC which specifically addresses climate 
change displacement. 
 
A detailed assessment of the merits of the multilateral instrument options listed above is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Briefly, the author: 
• shares the strong reservations expressed by a number of commentators concerning 
suggested redrafting or supplementing the 1951 Refugee Convention in order to 
confer refugee or protect person status on persons displaced for environmental or 
climate change-related reasons;39 
• concurs with the views expressed by McAdam and others regarding the short-
medium term practical and political impediments to negotiation of an effective 
stand-alone multilateral treaty or convention addressing climate 
change/environmental displacement, while not ruling out entirely the possibility 
of such an international instrument being developed in the fullness of time; 
• sees potential for some sort of multilateral framework for coordinating state and 
regional arrangements and responses for climate change-related displacement to 
be included in future UNFCCC instruments or decisions, however doubts that 
in the short-medium term, a full-blown dedicated protocol is likely to be 
politically or practically feasible. 
 
Regional solutions? 
Coordinated regional arrangements, whether recorded in ‘hard law’ instruments or ‘soft 
law’ declarations or statements offer a number of distinct advantages over fully 
multilateral negotiated outcomes. In the climate displacement context, this is particularly 
the case for a number of reasons.  Firstly, there is the pragmatic issue of reaching a 
meaningful agreement which contains sufficient specificity and relevance to usefully 
guide the development of domestic emigration/immigration, protection and other 
support processes. As has been rightly noted by a number of commentators, for an issue 
likely to be as politically contentious and sensitive as immigration and refugee policy, the 
prospects of achieving consensus on the large number of issues that would need to be 
addressed in such a document within a workable timeframe can only be regarded as 
wildly optimistic.  
 
On the other hand, documented agreed regional arrangements (while still likely to be 
challenging politically for the same reasons as those noted above) would appear to have 
                                                        
38 See, for example, Docherty, B & Giannini, T, ‘Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention 
on Climate Change Refugees’ (2009) 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 349; Hodkinson, D et al, ‘Hour When the 
Ship Comes in: A Convention for Persons Displaced by Climate-change’ (2009) accessible at 
www.ccdpconvention.com. 
 
39 See, for example McAdam, J, 2011, 'Refusing 'Refuge' in the Pacific: (De)Constructing Climate-
Induced Displacement in International Law', in Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pecoud & Paul de Guchtenieree 
(ed.), Migration and Climate Change, Cambridge University Press/ UNESCO, Cambridge, at 13-14; 
Burson, B, ‘Securing meaninful international agreement on climate change related displacement and 
migration: The Refugee Convention as a Window on International Burden (Responsibility) – Sharing in 
an Involuntary Movement Context’ in Climate Change and Displacement Reader (Scott Leckie, Ezekiel 
Simperingham and Jordan Bakker, eds., Taylor & Francis, Routledge/Earthscan, 2012, at 167.   
better prospects of success, especially if negotiated through existing regional fora and if 
they build upon existing regional arrangements, including institutional as well as legal 
and political affirmations of shared policy objectives. 
 
In the South Pacific context, the Pacific Islands Forum has the question of regional 
responses to climate displacement already on its agenda and, no doubt, would be central 
to the development of a coordinated regional response.  
 
The Swiss and Norwegian-led Nansen Initiative, a “state-led, bottom-up consultative 
process…intended to build consensus on the development of a protection agenda 
addressing the needs of people displaced across international borders by natural disasters, 
including the effects of climate change” held the first of a planned series of five regional 
consultations in Rarotonga in May 2013.40  The New Zealand government was 
represented at the event.  
 
The outcome document from that consultation exercise records agreement amongst 
participants that:41 
• “As a consequence of sea level rise, acidification and more extreme weather 
patterns, voluntary migration, planned relocation and forced displacement are 
expected to rise significantly in the next decades and beyond”;  
• “In the context of natural disasters and climate change these developments 
require action and resource mobilization to be taken at community, national, 
regional and international levels; 
 
Regional actions agreed as necessary included 
• “Continue the regional dialogue on voluntary migration, forced displacement and 
planned relocation”; and 
• “Develop appropriate normative frameworks to address the protection needs of 
displaced or relocated populations, including temporary protection schemes or 
template agreements, which take into account lessons from past experience and 
incorporate existing good practices from the Pacific Island countries. 
   
It will be interesting to observe the New Zealand government’s response, in particular to 
the second action point noted above.  
 
Conclusions 
For compelling historical, cultural and social reasons, most residents of Pacific nations at 
risk from the effects of climate change regard remaining where they are, and developing 
adaptive solutions to issues such as rising sea level and increased exposure to weather 
events, as their first priority.  
 
However, it is clearly the case that migration - whether that is to other, closer, Pacific 
neighbours such as Fiji, or to countries such as Australia and New Zealand where more 
                                                        
40 For a thoughtful assessment of the potential for the Nansen Initiative to facilitate solutions in relation to 
climate displacement, see Kälin, W, ‘From the Nansen Principles to the Nansen Initiative’ FMR 41 
December 2012 at 48. 
41 Nansen Initiative, ‘Conclusions: Nansen Initiative Pacific Regional Consultation’, Undated (recording 
outcome of meetings in Rarotonga from 21 to 24 May 2013), Nansen Initiative Secretariat, Geneva. 
favourable employment and other opportunities likely to exist - is not only under 
contemplation, but is also a predictable and rational response as part of a wider set of 
potential adaptive responses to the effects of climate change in the region.  
 
To date, despite rhetorical support for its Pacific neighbours, the New Zealand 
government has not actively engaged with legal, policy or practical implications of likely 
significant future flows of climate change-related migration to its shores.  Its current 
policy, if it can be described as such, is not substantively more than a vague commitment 
to ‘wait and see.’ No doubt this is convenient in terms of existing domestic politics. But a 
failure to plan now will have lasting adverse consequences which, it is suggested, New 
Zealand, as well as its Pacific neighbours, will come to regret. 
